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INTRODUCTION
David Resnick was accused of sexually abusing two young boys,
among other charges.1 FBI special agents twice asked Resnick to
submit to a polygraph examination, and twice he refused.2 In his first
refusal, Resnick asserted that he would have to speak to his lawyer
before submitting to the polygraph test, noting that polygraph tests
were unreliable.3 At trial the prosecution introduced testimony about
Resnick’s refusal to take a polygraph test and argued it was evidence
of his guilt during closing arguments.4 After a four-day trial, the jury

* J.D. candidate, May 2017, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A., Psychology, University of California—Los Angeles.
1
United States v. Resnick, 823 F.3d 888, 891 (7th Circ. 2016), reh’g en banc
denied, 835 F.3d 658, 660 (7th Cir. 2016).
2
Id. at 900 (Bauer, J., dissenting)
3
Id.
4
Id.
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convicted Resnick on all four counts5 and he was sentenced to life
imprisonment.6
In United States v. Resnick, since the defense did not object to the
prosecution’s adversarial use of Resnick’s refusal to take a polygraph
test at trial, the Seventh Circuit applied plain error review to assess
whether Resnick’s conviction should be reversed.7 After applying
plain error analysis, the majority held that even though the prosecution
might have violated Resnick’s Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination, the violation nonetheless failed to rise to the level of
plain error.8
Plain error analysis is the type of appellate review applied when a
party fails to object to an error at the moment it happens during trial.9
Because of the interest in the finality of judgments, parties are
encouraged to make timely objections.10 To incentivize timely
objections, Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
prescribes that a party loses its right to appeal an error if an objection
to it is not contemporaneously made.11 However, cases from the early
twentieth century held that the public interest required that courts
correct errors that harmed the integrity of the judicial system, even
when such errors were not timely objected to.12
In the last thirty years, the plain error doctrine has changed
substantially both in principle and in form. Interpretations by the
United States Supreme Court have vastly departed from its original
5

The counts included aggravated sexual abuse of a minor, interstate
transportation of child pornography, brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime,
and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Id. at 892.
6
Id. In addition to the life sentence, Resnick received a consecutive seven-year
sentence.
7
Id. at 896.
8
Id. at 898.
9
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993); United States v. Frady,
456 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1982).
10
See Frady, 456 U.S. at 163.
11
Id. at 162.
12
See United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936); New York C.R.
Co. v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 310, 318 (1929).
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articulation. Rather than serving as a protection for both the accused
and the whole of society, its current rigidity provides restitution for
only those lucky enough to be able to prove their innocence, with little
regard for the public’s faith in the fairness of our justice system. The
principles in which plain error review is grounded must be revisited
and the standard revised.
Part I of this article examines the Supreme Court’s interpretation
of the plain error doctrine within the last thirty years and the resultant
inconsistent applications by the Court and the Seventh Circuit. Part II
of this article analyzes and critiques Resnick’s holding. Finally, Part III
proposes a revised version of plain error review more closely aligned
with the spirit of the original standard.
PLAIN ERROR REVIEW
A.

Background

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) is a codification of the
plain error review standard set forth in United States v. Atkinson.13
Rule 52(b) provides that “[a] plain error that affects substantial rights
may be considered even though it was not brought to the court’s
attention.”14
In Atkinson,15 the Supreme Court acknowledged that a verdict
would not ordinarily be set aside for an error not objected to at trial.16
13

United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 7 (1985).
Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).
15
297 U.S. 157 (1936). Atkinson involved a civil action brought against the
United States by a plaintiff seeking payment from war risk insurance. He claimed
that under the policy, loss of hearing in both ears constituted a total disability. The
district court found against the government. On appeal, the government claimed that
the jury instruction erroneously stated that the jury could find for the plaintiff on the
theory that the plaintiff’s loss of hearing in both years, if permanent, was a
permanent disability as defined by the policy. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the
district’s court’s holding. The Supreme Court, noting that the government had failed
to make a timely objection to the jury instruction, held that any potential error
presented by the government was not exceptional enough to correct. Id. at 158-60.
16
Id. at 160.
14

3
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2017

3

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 2

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 12, Issue 1

Fall 2016

The Court, however, conceded that an appellate court could, under
special circumstances, make an exception to this rule.17 The Court
went on to explain when this exception might be appropriate:
In exceptional circumstances, especially in criminal cases,
appellate courts, in the public interest, may, of their own
motion, notice errors to which no exception has been taken, if
the errors are obvious, or if they otherwise seriously affect
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.18
This came to be known as the original plain review standard.19
This standard focused on the obviousness of the error and its effect on
judicial fairness, reputation, and integrity.20 In other words, an error
was reversible if it was so palpable that not addressing it would harm
the integrity of the judicial system or if the error tarnished the judicial
system in any other way.21 After the Atkinson standard was codified by
Rule 52(b) in 1944, the type of analysis to determine whether there
was an error in need of curing came to be known as “plain error
review.”22 Today’s incarnation of this standard is very distinct from the
original version.23 Rather than focusing on the effect of the error on
17

Id.
Id. (emphasis added). Johnson, which Atkinson cited after laying down its
standard, placed emphasis on the fact that the integrity and fairness of trials were of
public concern and that this public imperative gave the court authority to correct trial
errors even when objections were not timely made. “The public interest requires that
the court of its own motion, as is its power and duty, protect suitors in their right to a
verdict uninfluenced by the appeals of counsel to passion or prejudice. Where such
paramount considerations are involved, the failure of counsel to particularize an
exception will not preclude this Court from correcting the error.” Johnson, 279 U.S.
at 318-19 (citing Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 450 (1926)).
19
See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 7 (1985).
20
See Atkinson, 297 U.S. at 160.
21
See id.; Johnson, 279 U.S. at 318-19.
22
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).
23
See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-37 (1993).
18

4
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the public’s faith in the judicial system, the standard now narrowly
centers on the outcome of the particular case.24
B.

Inconsistent Application of Plain Error Review by the
Supreme Court

In the last thirty years, the Supreme Court has interpreted the
plain error review standard inconsistently in different cases, leading to
confusion about the standard’s proper application. This inconsistency
is evidenced by the Court’s decisions in United States v. Young,25
United States v. Olano,26 Johnson v. United States,27 and United States
v. Dominguez Benitez.28
In Young, the Court deviated from the Atkinson paradigm and
added an additional variable to plain error analysis—the weight of the
evidence against the accused.29 This deviation laid the foundation for
the current version of plain error review in which the error is looked at
side-by-side with the evidence against the defendant.30 The addition of
this variable initiated the Court’s shift away from the Atkinson
framework toward a standard more closely resembling the cause and
actual prejudice standard used in collateral review.31
24

See id.; Young, 470 U.S. at 19-20.
470 U.S. 1 (1985).
26
507 U.S. 725 (1993).
27
520 U.S. 461 (1997).
28
542 U.S. 74 (2004).
29
See Young, 470 U.S. at 19-20.
30
See id.
31
A collateral challenge is an appellate request when no timely objection was
made at trial and after the the time allotted to file an appeal has expired. Because of
this, collateral attacks present a higher hurdle to claimants. The type of review
applied to this type of appeal is called the cause and actual prejudice standard. Under
this standard a convicted defendant must show both (1) a good reason why he failed
to make a timely objection and a timely appeal and (2) that the error caused him
actual prejudice. This standard is more stringent than plain error review and requires
a heightened showing of prejudice. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165-68
(1982).
25

5
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The Young Court summarized the plain error standard as a rule to
be “used sparingly, solely under those circumstances in which a
miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.”32 Importantly, in its
description of the plain error standard, the Court included the second
disjunctive prong of the Atkinson standard (serious effect on “the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings”) while
omitting the first (“if the errors are obvious”).33 The Court proceeded
to explain that plain error analysis must also involve evaluating the
error against the entire trial record.34
The Court concluded that a prosecutor’s remarks expressing his
personal belief as to the defendant’s guilt, and admonitions to the jury
to “do their job” and convict the defendant, although improper, did not
unfairly sway the jury.35 The majority found that the prosecutorial
remarks did not undermine “the fairness of the trial and contribute to a
miscarriage of justice” because the weight of the other evidence
against the defendant was substantial enough for the jury to hang its
hat on.36 The Court pointed to the fact that not a single witness had
supported the defense and that the substantial and uncontradicted
evidence indicated, beyond any doubt, the defendant’s deliberateness
to defraud a customer.37
In his dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall and
Justice Blackmun, cited to Atkinson and expressed that a plain error
requires reversal of a conviction if the error may be said “either (1) to
32

Young, 470 U.S. at 15 (quoting Frady, 456 U.S. at 163, n. 14).
See id. at 15; United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936) (“In
exceptional circumstances, especially in criminal cases, appellate courts, in the
public interest, may of their own motion, notice errors to which no exception has
been taken, if the errors are obvious, or if they otherwise seriously affect the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”) (emphasis added).
34
Young, 470 U.S. at 16.
35
Id. at 18.
36
Id. at 19.
37
Id. (“Finally, the overwhelming evidence of respondent’s intent to defraud
Apco and submit false oil certifications to the Government eliminates any lingering
doubt that the prosecutor’s remarks unfairly prejudiced the jury’s deliberations or
exploited the Government’s prestige in the eyes of the jury.”).
33

6
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have created an unacceptable danger of prejudicial influence on the
jury’s verdict, or (2) to have ‘seriously [affected] the … integrity or
public reputation of [the] judicial proceedings.”38 Notably, Justice
Brennan kept the standard as a disjunctive test, with either the first or
second prong satisfying the standard.39 After concluding that, contrary
to the majority’s opinion, there were facts to establish that the
prosecutor’s remarks led to “possible prejudice”40 to the defendant,
Justice Brennan noted that the majority failed to consider the second
disjunctive Atkinson prong - whether the prosecutor’s misconduct
“seriously [affected] the … integrity or public reputation of [the]
judicial proceedings.”41 Justice Brennan expressed concern that
prosecutorial improprieties such as the one in this case might present a
recurring problem thus endangering the integrity and public reputation
of the judicial system.42 Similar to Justice Brennan, Justice Stevens, in
a separate dissent, also highlighted the effect of the error on the
integrity of the judicial system as an important plain error review
factor.43
In United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25 (1988), three years after
Young was decided, Justice Blackmun acknowledged that the Young
Court had essentially broken down the Atkinson plain error standard
into a two-part conjunctive inquiry: 44 “whether the error ‘seriously
38

Id. at 30 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Id.
40
It is important to note that the term “possible prejudice” is contrary to the
majority’s belief that the error, when looked at against the evidence, must show that
prejudice existed, not just that it was possible. Justice Brennan’s use of the term
“prejudicial impact” further alludes to his belief that a showing of actual prejudice is
not required. See id. at 31-32.
41
Id. at 33 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
42
Id.
43
See id. at 37 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“I do not understand how anyone
could dispute the proposition that the prosecutor’s comments were obviously
prejudicial. Instead, the question is whether the degree of prejudice buttressed by the
legitimate interest in deterring prosecutorial misconduct, is sufficient to warrant
reversal.”).
44
See United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 35 (1988) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part). It is important to note that the original plain
39
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affected substantial rights,’ and whether the error ‘had an unfair
prejudicial impact on the jury’s deliberations.’”45 Although Justice
Blackmun agreed that plain error analysis required some form of
prejudicial impact inquiry, he expressed that the Young majority’s
failure to define the prejudice prong did more harm than good.46
Justice Blackmun proposed that to clear the confusion, the Court
should either formulate a plain error test articulating the prejudice
standard, or it should embrace plain error’s lack of rigidity and assert
that its language in Young should not be interpreted as a test.47 He then
suggested that a less rigid application of plain error review would be
more faithful to the purpose of the plain error doctrine.48
Seven years after Young was decided, the Supreme Court in
United States v. Olano49 took the former of Justice Blackmun’s
suggestions by creating a more rigid application of plain error review
and positing a four-part inquiry focusing heavily on the issue of
prejudice.50 The issue considered in Olano was whether it was plain
error for the district court to have allowed an alternate juror to be
present during deliberations without obtaining individual waivers from
all seven defendants.51 In applying Young’s two-part plain error
error standard (Atkinson standard) was a disjunctive inquiry—plain error could be
found if “the errors are obvious, or if they otherwise seriously affect the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Atkinson,
297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936) (emphasis added).
45
Robinson, 485 U.S. at 35 (emphasis added). Can’t use id- previous cite has
two citations.
46
Id. (“While any application of the plain-error doctrine necessarily includes
some form of prejudice inquiry, the Court’s attempt to isolate that inquiry without
giving it any substantive definition may have produced more mischief than clarity.”).
47
See id. at 36-37.
48
See id. (quoting Atkinson, 297 U.S. at 160) (suggesting that appellate courts
should have more discretion to consider circumstances in which allowing a
“conviction to stand would severely undermine ‘the fairness integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.’”).
49
507 U.S. 725 (1993).
50
See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-37 (1993).
51
Id. at 729-30. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(c) prohibits the
presence of alternate jurors during final jury deliberations: “… An alternate juror

8
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analysis, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals first held that the district
court erred in allowing the alternate juror’s presence during
deliberations.52 The Ninth Circuit explained that although the juror did
not vocally participate in the deliberations, it was possible that the
alternate juror conveyed his or her attitudes through body language,
therefore having some effect on the other jurors’ decision.53 Next, the
Ninth Circuit answered the two-part plain error inquiry by concluding
that the violation was in plain error “because the violation was
inherently prejudicial and because it infring[ed] upon a substantial
right of the defendants.”54
The Ninth Circuit’s application of plain error review prompted the
Supreme Court to grant certiorari for the purpose of clarifying the
standard.55 Attempting to unpack the broad language of Rule 52(b), the
Court broke down plain error review into four distinct elements.56
First, there must be an error.57 Any deviation from a legal rule is
an “error” unless the defendant intentionally waived that rule.58
Second, the error must be plain.59 In order for an error to be “plain,”
the legal rule must be clear or obvious under current law.60

who does not replace a regular juror shall be discharged after the jury retires to
consider its verdict.” Id. at 730 (quoting Fed R. Crim. P. 24(c)).
52
Id. at 730.
53
Id. at 730-31.
54
Id. at 731 (emphasis added).
55
See id.
56
See id. at 732-37.
57
Id. at 732-33.
58
Id. at 733-34 (“If a legal rule was violated during the district court
proceedings, and if the defendant did not waive the rule, then there has been an
“error” within the meaning of Rule 52(b) despite the absence of a timely
objection.”). As an example of intentional waiver, the court explained that a
defendant who knowingly and voluntarily pleads guilty cannot then have his
conviction overturned by an appellate court on the ground that the trial court erred in
not granting him a trial. Id. at 733.
59
Id. at 734.
60
Id.

9
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Third, the error must affect substantial rights.61 The Court equated
“substantial rights” with prejudice62 and interpreted it to mean that the
plain error must have affected the outcome of the district court
proceedings.63 In other words, the error must have been prejudicial to
the defendant.64 In its attempt to articulate what “prejudice” meant in
the context of plain error review, the Court explained that appellate
courts must determine whether the error “had a prejudicial impact on
the jury’s deliberations.”65 The Court emphasized that normally the
defendant must make a specific showing of prejudice to satisfy the
“affecting substantial rights” prong.66 Fourth, plain error may only be
noticed to prevent a miscarriage of justice.67 The Court explained that
although an appellate court may correct a plain error that affected a
defendant’s substantial rights, it is not obligated to do so unless it
would result in a “miscarriage of justice.”68 Specifically, the Court
asserted that a plain error affecting substantial rights should only be
corrected if, after satisfying the preceding three prongs, the error also

61

Id.
The Court later proclaimed that it need not decide whether “affecting
substantial rights” is always synonymous with “prejudicial.” Id. at 735.
63
Id. at 734.
64
Id.
65
Id. (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 at 17, n. 14). The Court
differentiated harmless error review from plain error review and explained that
although the two share the same basic inquiry, was the error prejudicial, in plain
error review it is the defendant, and not the prosecution, that bears the burden to
persuade the court that he or she was prejudiced by the error. Id.
66
Id. at 735. The Court also stated that there might be a special category of forfeited
errors that could be corrected regardless of their impact on the outcome of the case,
as well as cases in which the errors should be presumed to be prejudicial and require
no proof from the defendant. See id. Unfortunately, the Court declined to explain
when those special circumstances would apply.
67
Id. at 736.
68
Id. (noting that in the collateral review context, “the term ‘miscarriage of
justice’ means that the defendant is actually innocent,” but that Rule 52(b) is not a
remedy only for cases in which the defendant is actually innocent).
62
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“seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.”69
After applying this four-part inquiry to the facts of the case, the
majority concluded that although allowing the alternate juror to be
present during the jury deliberations was plain error, the error did not
affect the defendants’ substantial rights.70 The Court explained that the
ultimate question in its application of the third prong, was whether the
error affected the jury’s deliberations and verdict either specifically or
presumptively.71 In holding that there was no prejudicial effect,
therefore no substantial rights violation, the Court pointed to the fact
that the record contained no direct evidence that the alternate juror’s
presence influenced the verdict.72 Specifically, the Court explained
that the defendants failed to show that the alternate juror either
participated in the deliberation or produced a chilling effect on the
regular jurors with his or her body language.73 The Court also declined
to presume that the error was inherently prejudicial, as the Ninth
Circuit had done.74 The Court reasoned that because the alternate juror
was instructed by the judge not to participate in the deliberations, the
Ninth Circuit should not have presumed that this instruction had been
disregarded.75 Because the third prong of the Court’s plain error test
was not satisfied, the Court did not consider the fourth—whether the
error “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.”76
Contrary to the majority, the three dissenters in Olano, led by
Justice Stevens, concluded that the defendants’ substantial rights had
69

Id. 736-37 (“a plain error affecting substantial rights does not, without more,
satisfy the Atkinson standard …”).
70
Id. at 737-38.
71
Id. at 739.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 740.
75
See id. (“[It is] the almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow
their instructions.”) (quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987)).
76
Id. at 741.
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been violated.77 Justice Stevens de-emphasized the importance of
prejudicial impact in plain error review and instead stressed the
importance of preventing injury to the integrity of the judicial
system.78 Some defects affecting the jury’s deliberative function, he
explained, are subject to reversal regardless of whether the defendant
can show prejudice, “not only because it is so difficult to measure their
effects on a jury’s decision, but also because such defects ‘undermine
the structural integrity of the criminal tribunal itself.’”79
The opinions in Johnson v. United States80 and United States v.
Dominguez Benitez81 reflect how difficult Olano made plain error
analysis to apply. In Johnson, the petitioner argued that the district
court had committed plain error in deciding the element of materiality
in a perjury case instead of submitting that issue to the jury.82 After
determining that the current law stated that the jury must decide the
question of materiality in a perjury case, the Court determined that the
lower court had committed an error and the error was plain.83 The
Court then decided that because the defendant failed to meet the fourth
prong of the Olano test, it need not decide the third.84
As in Olano, the Court in Johnson focused heavily on the
prejudice component—the error’s effect on the outcome of the
defendant’s case.85 However, instead of applying the prejudice inquiry
to the third prong of the Olano test, the Court applied it to the fourth
77

Id. at 743 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See id. at 743-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (returning to the original Atkinson
standard where plain error may be found “if the errors are obvious, or if they
otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings”) (emphasis added).
79
Id. at 743 (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263-64 (1986)).
80
520 U.S. 461 (1997)
81
542 U.S. 74 (2004).
82
Johnson, 520 U.S. at 463.
83
Id. at 467.
84
Id. at 469 (explaining that even assuming the error did affect substantial
rights of the defendant, there was no plain error because the defendant was not able
to meet the fourth Olano prong).
85
See id. at 469-70
78
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(whether not noticing the error would result in a miscarriage of
justice).86 The Court concluded that the fourth prong was not met
because the defendant had failed to show that the error had prejudiced
the outcome of his case.87 It explained that the evidence supporting the
materiality of the false statement was overwhelming and
uncontroverted at trial.88 Therefore, the Court continued, whether the
issue of materiality would have gone to the jury instead of mistakenly
going to the judge made no difference in the outcome of the trial; the
jury, like the judge, would have also decided that the false statement
was material.89 By applying a prejudice inquiry to the fourth prong,
the Johnson Court expanded the weight to be given to prejudice,
creating a higher hurdle for plain error appellants and pushing the
focus of plain error review further away from the original Atkinson
standard.90
In Dominguez Benitez, the Court asserted a standard of
measurement for determining whether the degree of prejudice was
enough to satisfy Olano’s substantial rights prong.91 The Court
followed United States v. Bagley,92 in invoking a reasonable
probability standard—a requirement that a defendant show “a
reasonable probability that, but for [the error claimed], the result of the
proceeding would have been different.”93 The Court explained that a
court may notice a plain error if after reviewing the entire record, the

86

See id.
See id.
88
Id. at 470.
89
See id.
90
Recall that the original standard in Atkinson was more broadly focused on
the error’s effect on the integrity of the court and the public’s faith in it. See United
States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160; see also New York C.R. Co. v. Johnson, 279
U.S. 310, 318-319 (emphasizing that trials are never purely just about the litigants
involved and the public’s interests must be served).
91
See United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81-83 (2004).
92
473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
93
Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 82-83.
87
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probability of a different result is “‘sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome of the proceeding.”94
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia drew attention to the confused
state of prejudice standards.95 He pointed out that the Court at the time
had adopted at least four different standards for assessing prejudice.96
Among these were: (a) the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
standard for use on direct review of a constitutional error and
conviction;97 (b) the substantial and injurious effect or influence
standard for use on collateral review;98 (c) the reasonable probability
standard such as the one used by the majority in the present case;99 and
(d) the less-defendant friendly more likely than not standard for use on
claims of newly discovered evidence after conviction.100 Noting the
difficulty of applying different gradations of prejudice to hypothesized
outcomes,101 he concluded that the traditional “beyond a reasonable
doubt” and “more likely than not” standards were the only workable
standards for plain error prejudice analysis.102

94

Id. at 83.
See id. at 86-87 (Scalia, J., concurring).
96
Id. at 86.
97
See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), superseded by statute,
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)
(2016), as recognized in Perkins v. Herbert, 596 F.3d 161, 175 (2d Cir. 2010).
98
See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993).
99
See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111-13 (1976); Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
100
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94.
101
See Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 86 (“Such ineffable gradations of
probability seem to me quite beyond the ability of the judicial mind (or any mind) to
grasp, and thus harmful rather than helpful to the consistency and rationality of
judicial decisionmaking.”).
102
Id. at 87 (“I would hold that, where a defendant has failed to object at trial,
and thus has the burden of proving that a mistake he failed to prevent had an effect
on his substantial rights, he must show that effect to be probable, that is, more likely
than not.”).
95
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Inconsistent Application of Plain Error Review by the Seventh
Circuit

The confusion as to the correct application of plain error analysis
has led the Seventh Circuit to produce inconsistent holdings.103 In
United States v. Paladino,104 the Seventh Circuit Court acknowledged
this confusion as it struggled to differentiate the “substantial rights”
prong from the “fairness and integrity” prong of Olano.105 It suggested
two different sets of interpretations for both of these prongs.106
The first, more rigid, interpretation was that the third element,
“substantial rights,” required a showing of prejudice—but for the
error, the verdict might have been different. The fourth element,
“fairness, integrity, or public reputation” required a showing that,
absent intervention by an appellate court, there would be a miscarriage
of justice—the result would be intolerable (such as the conviction of
an innocent person). 107
The second, more lenient, interpretation suggested by the Seventh
Circuit was that the showing of prejudice should be applied to the
fourth prong, not the third.108 The court proposed that in this second
interpretation, “substantial rights” referred to an important right, rather
than a mere technical right, and that to satisfy the fourth prong, a
defendant must show prejudice – the likelihood that the verdict ‘was
actually affected by the error.’”109
103

Compare United States v. Tucker, 714 F.3d 1006 (7th Cir. 2013); United
States v. Hills, 618 F.3d 619 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Ochoa-Zarate, 540
F.3d 613 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 2005)
with United States v. Resnick, 823 F.3d 888, 891 (7th Circ. 2016), reh’g en banc
denied, 835 F.3d 658 (7th Cir. 2016).
104
401 F.3d 471 (7th Circ. 2005).
105
See id. at 481 (“[T]he difference between the ‘substantial rights’ and
‘fairness, integrity, or public reputation’ elements of the plain error standard is not
entirely clear.”).
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 482 (emphasis added).
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Even though the majority declined to express which interpretation
the court should adopt,110 it proceeded to explain plain error review in
terms of requiring a showing of probable prejudice and of
innocence.111 In his dissent, Judge Ripple, joined by Judge Kanne,
acknowledged that the majority had implicitly adopted the more
stringent plain error interpretation, and he rejected this rigid
interpretation.112
Similar to the error in Resnick, the alleged error in United States v.
Hills involved a Fifth Amendment violation.113 In Hills, a defendant
who had been convicted of conspiracy and filing false tax returns,
alleged that the prosecution had committed misconduct when it made
negative remarks in its closing argument about invoking the Fifth
Amendment right not to testify.114 Since the defense had failed to
object to the prosecutor’s comments at trial, the court began its
analysis by iterating the Olano four-part plain error review test.115
The court first determined that the prosecution’s comments were
made in error because it cast the defendant’s invocation of her
constitutional right in a negative light, which the court explained was
the very thing the right against self-incrimination sought to protect.116
110

See id. (reasoning that since there was plain error under the more rigid test,
the court need not pick which of the two interpretations should be applied).
111
See id. (“If an error is committed and the defendant is convicted, the
appellate court has only to consider whether the defendant would probably have
been acquitted had the error not occurred. If so—if the error may well have
precipitated a miscarriage of justice (which the conviction of an innocent person
is)—it is plain error and the defendant is entitled to a new trial.”). Importantly, the
challenged error in this case happened during the sentencing phase as opposed to the
guilt determination phase. See id.
112
See id. at 486 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
113
618 F.3d 619, 639 (7th Cir. 2010).
114
Id. The prosecution made the following remarks: “And you don’t really
need to worry about the Fifth Amendment protection unless you’re worried that
you’re [d]oing something illegal;” “They’re using the Fifth Amendment not as a
shield to protect themselves from incrimination, but as a sword to prevent the IRS
from getting the information that they are entitled to.” Id. at 640.
115
Id. at 639-40.
116
Id. at 641.
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Next, the court held that the district court’s allowance of the
prosecutorial statements was plain error for two reasons.117 First, the
court explained that the district judge had expressly warned the
prosecution to refrain from referring to the Fifth Amendment, and yet
the prosecution proceeded to reference the Fifth Amendment
anyway.118 Second, and most importantly, the court applied the
prejudice test to the second prong.119 The court honed in on the
egregiousness of the error itself explaining that there was more than a
“nontrivial possibility” that the references might have determined the
outcome of the case.120 In applying the crucial prejudice test to the
error itself, the court shifted the focus of the analysis to the gravity of
the error itself, away from the determinative influence of other
evidence.
After establishing that the prosecutorial remarks were plain error,
the court moved on to the third Olano inquiry—whether the error
affected the defendant’s substantial rights.121 The analysis the court
employed in determining this third prong consisted of a consideration
of five harmless error122 factors: “(1) the intensity and frequency of the
references, (2) which party elected to pursue the line of questioning,
(3) the use to which the prosecution put the silence, (4) the trial
judge’s opportunity to grant a motion for a mistrial or give a curative
instruction, and (5) the quantum of other evidence indicative of
guilt.”123
117

Id.
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Harmless error, codified as Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a), is
another type of direct appellate review where there is a “consideration of error raised
by a defendant’s timely objection, but subject to an opportunity on the Government’s
part to carry the burden of showing that any error was harmless, as having no effect
on the defendant’s substantial rights.” United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 62
(2002).
123
Hills, 618 F.3d at 641.
118
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Subsequent to applying these five factors, the Seventh Circuit
held that the prosecutorial remarks had affected the defendant’s
substantial rights.124 The court explained that despite the judge’s
explicit warning to refrain from doing so, the prosecution twice made
reference to the Fifth Amendment, the judge did not procure any
curative measures to prevent the jury from making improper use of the
remarks, and all of the evidence against the defendant was
circumstantial.125
Finally, in concluding that the error seriously affected the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings, the court
reasoned that if it failed to correct this error, the government would
feel entitled to intrude on defendants’ Fifth Amendment rights in
future cases.126 The Seventh Circuit explained that this would
disenfranchise the public from their constitutional right, thereby
injuring the integrity of the judicial system and the respect for
constitutional rule of law.127
UNITED STATES V. RESNICK
A.

Resnick Opinion

The Resnick majority, consisting of Judge Wood and Judge Sykes,
held that the prosecution’s incriminating use of Resnick’s refusal to
take a polygraph exam did not rise to the level of plain error.128 Justice
124

Id.
Id. at 641-42. Curiously, earlier in the opinion, the court had rejected
another appeal made by the defendant in which she claimed that the evidence
introduced against her at trial had not been sufficient to support both of her
convictions. In addressing this claim, the court concluded there was strong enough
circumstantial evidence for her conspiracy conviction, and that “there was more than
enough circumstantial evidence to establish that she was guilty of filing false tax
returns. Id. at 638-39.
126
Id. at 642.
127
Id.
128
United States v. Resnick, 823 F.3d 888, 898 (7th Circ. 2016), reh’g en banc
denied, 835 F.3d 658 (7th Cir. 2016).
125
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Bauer dissented.129 After applying the Olano four-pronged test for
plain error, the court reasoned that any error by the prosecution was
not plain and did not affect Resnick’s substantial rights in light of the
whole record.130
1.

Plain Error

The court explained that it had no need to answer the first Olano
question of whether the prosecution’s introduction of Resnick’s silence
was erroneous.131 It reasoned that because any error was not plain,
there was no need to decide this preliminary inquiry. 132 In considering
whether the prosecution’s actions were plain error, the court discussed
two potential types of error the prosecution might have committed—
evidentiary and constitutional.133
First, the court considered whether the district court violated any
evidentiary rules by admitting Resnick’s refusal to take a polygraph
test into evidence.134 The Seventh Circuit began by agreeing with
Resnick about the dubiousness of polygraph exams and the risk of
unfair prejudice.135 It noted that while the judicial and scientific
communities were well aware of the criticism polygraph tests face, lay
people still assigned the polygraph an “aura of infallibility,” which
could cause jurors to heavily rely on polygraph evidence to assess
credibility and guilt.136 After asserting a litany of cases across different
jurisdictions that rejected polygraph evidence, either through dicta or

129

Id. at 890.
See id. at 898.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 896-98.
134
Id. at 896-97
135
Id.
136
Id. at 897.
130
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per se rules, the Seventh Circuit averred that its own precedent pointed
only towards the exclusion of polygraph evidence.137
However, the court also stated that, unlike other circuits, it had
never established a blanket rule excluding the use of polygraph
evidence.138 Instead, the court continued, the Seventh Circuit had
given district courts substantial discretion on the issue.139 The court
concluded by stating that because the law on polygraph evidence was
not settled and the case against Resnick was “airtight,” it could not
definitively say that admitting the refusal to submit to a polygraph was
plain error.140
Next, the court turned to the issue of whether Resnick
suffered a Fifth Amendment violation by having his right to silence
used against him.141 The court began by acknowledging that a
polygraph examination is almost always a custodial interrogation
triggering Miranda rights.142 Therefore, the court continued, “absent a
waiver of [F]ifth [A]mendment rights, a person may not be compelled
to submit to a polygraph examination.”143 The court then recognized
that the “natural corollary” to that rule is that a defendant’s refusal to
submit to a polygraph cannot be used against him as evidence.144 It
nonetheless reasoned that because the Seventh Circuit had never
explicitly held that the refusal to take a polygraph violated the Fifth
Amendment, any error committed by the district court was not
plain.145 Finally, the court added that any prejudice to Resnick was
137

Id. at 896-97 (“It is no surprise that our own decisions have, in practice,
pointed in only one direction: affirming the exclusion of polygraph evidence.”).
138
Id. at 897.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id. Miranda rights include the right to remain silent and the right to an
attorney. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966). A custodial
interrogation is any type of police questioning while an individual is deprived of his
freedom in any significant way. Id. at 478.
143
Resnick, 823 F.3d at 897.
144
Id.
145
Id. at 898.
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minimal, as his refusal to take a polygraph was mentioned only once
by each side during closing, the other evidence against him was
strong, and his credibility could not have been impaired since he did
not testify at trial.146
2.

Substantial Rights

The court concluded by noting that Resnick failed to make a
specific showing of prejudice in order to satisfy the substantial rights
prong of the Olano test.147 It argued that because the record as a whole
pointed towards Resnick’s guilt, any error committed during his trial
had no effect on his substantial rights.148
B.

Justice Bauer’s Dissent

Contrary to the majority, Justice Bauer argued that the district
court had committed reversible plain error.149 He asserted that the
district court’s errors were both constitutional and evidentiary in
nature.150 In addition to noting that precedent concerning evidentiary
rules clearly established that polygraph evidence should be excluded,
Justice Bauer explained that precedent also clearly and obviously
established that the Fifth Amendment prohibited a defendant’s right to
silence being used against him.151 He asserted that the district court
146

Id. at 898.
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id. (Bauer, J., dissenting).
150
Id. at 901 (Bauer, J., dissenting).
151
Id. at 899 (Bauer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination … grant[s] … an absolute right.”) (quoting Greene v. Finley, 749
F.2d 467, 472 (7th Cir. 1984)). Judge Bauer further noted that “the government is
‘prohibit[ed] … from treat[ing] a defendant’s exercise of his right to remain silent at
trial as substantive evidence of guilt.’” Id. (citing United States v. Ochoa-Zarate, 540
F.3d 613, 617 (7th Cir. 2008)). Additionally, “[i]f a defendant refuses to testify or
invokes his Miranda rights, the prosecutor cannot comment on this refusal to the
jury.” Id. (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 (1966)).
147

21
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2017

21

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 2

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 12, Issue 1

Fall 2016

had violated a bedrock principle of the criminal justice system by
imposing a penalty on a defendant for his exercising of a constitutional
privilege.152
Justice Bauer was also disturbed by the majority’s use of other
evidence against Resnick in its plain error analysis.153 He explained
that the majority’s reasoning implied that a court could ignore a
defendant’s rights if the evidence against him was strong enough.154
He continued by asserting that the majority had misunderstood
Olano’s fourth prong, and thereby was misinterpreting plain error
review by implying that a defendant must prove his innocence in order
for a plain error correction to be warranted.155 The only issue on
appeal, Justice Bauer argued, was whether Resnick received a fair
trial, and the gravity of the district court’s error indicated that he had
not.156
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT WRONGLY DECIDED RESNICK
The Seventh Circuit erred in its Resnick decision in four ways: (1)
it failed to recognize that evidence incriminating a defendant for
refusing to take a polygraph clearly violates the Fifth Amendment; (2)
it ignored the gravity of the error; (3) it placed too much emphasis on
the other evidence against Resnick; and (4) it ignored the error’s
injurious effect to the integrity of the judicial system. The Seventh
Circuit’s wrongful holding in Resnick is not surprising, however, given
the disarrayed state of the plain error doctrine.

152

Resnick, 823 F.3d at 901 (Bauer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 902 (Bauer, J., dissenting).
154
Id.
155
Id. (“[T]he Supreme Court noted in Olano that ‘we have never held that’
remand for plain error ‘is only warranted in cases of actual innocence.’ This court
has reaffirmed that a defendant need not ‘establish actual innocence’ under Olano
plain error review to trigger remand.” (citing United States v. Driver, 242 F.3d 767,
771 (7th Cir. 2001)).
156
Id.
153
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The Seventh Circuit Failed to Appropriately Regard a WellRecognized Constitutional Protection

The Resnick majority asserted that because the Seventh Circuit
had never before explicitly held that the refusal to take a polygraph
test implicated the Fifth Amendment, the prosecution’s use of
Resnick’s refusal to take such a test was not plain error.157 However,
the court’s reasoning for such a conclusion was acutely unsound and
contradictory.
The majority spent a considerable amount of time explaining why
polygraph examinations trigger Fifth Amendment protections.158 The
court not only contended that polygraph examinations elicit Fifth
Amendment protections, but also that generally, that a defendant’s
refusal to submit to a polygraph may not be used as incriminating
evidence.159 To support this contention, the court cited to other circuit
court opinions which have explicitly held that a defendant’s refusal to
submit to a polygraph examination cannot be used against him.160 The
court noted that a polygraph examination is almost always a custodial
interrogation, which triggers Miranda rights, particularly the right to
silence.161 Therefore, the court asserted, a person may not be
compelled to submit to a polygraph test, assuming the individual has
not waived his right.162
Perplexingly, after acknowledging that using a defendant’s refusal
to submit to a polygraph violated the Fifth Amendment, the majority
concluded that the prosecution’s use of Resnick’s refusal was not a
plain error, as it had “never before held that the refusal to take a
polygraph implicate[d] the Fifth Amendment.”163 This implied that in
157

Id. at 898.
Id. at 897-98
159
Id. at 897.
160
Id. at 897-98 (citing Garmon v. Lumpkin Cnty., Ga., 878 F.2d 1406, 1410
(11th Cir. 1989) and United States v. St. Clair, 855 F.2d 518, 523 (8th Cir. 1988)).
161
Id. at 897.
162
Id.
163
Id. at 898.
158
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order for a rule to be “clear,” the Seventh Circuit must have
previously ruled explicitly on a specific matter.
However, a rule, law, or precedent need not specify every type of
circumstance which would fall under its purview. For example, an
ordinance that prohibits motor vehicles from travelling in excess of
thirty-five miles per hour on a roadway need not specify all modes of
transportation qualifying as “motor vehicles.” Perhaps the first thing
that comes to mind is a car, but it would be illogical to reason that
because the ordinance didn’t specifically state that it also applied to
motorcycles, motorcycles somehow fell out of the ordinance’s ambit; a
motorcycle is a type of motor vehicle after all.
Likewise, just because the Seventh Circuit has never explicitly
ruled that a polygraph examination triggers the Fifth Amendment right
to silence, it does not mean that a polygraph exam doesn’t fall under
the Fifth Amendment ambit. Just like in the motor vehicle example
above, a polygraph examination is a type of custodial interrogation,
which the Supreme Court has clearly stated triggers the Fifth
Amendment right to silence and to not have that silence used against
the accused.164
B.

The Seventh Circuit Ignored the Gravity of the Error

The court failed to notice how the credibility of Resnick’s case
might have been undermined by the prosecution’s comments about his
refusal to submit to a polygraph. The court itself acknowledged that
polygraph evidence entails a substantial possibility of prejudice
because “the aura of infallibility attending polygraph evidence can
lead jurors to abandon their duty to assess credibility and guilt.”165
This misguided reliance, the court continued, had the possibility of
leading jurors to believe that a person who refuses to take a polygraph

164

See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965); Doyle v. Ohio, 426
U.S. 610, 618 (1976).
165
Resnick, 823 F.3d at 897 (quoting Unites States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303,
314 (1998).
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has something to hide.166 The court acknowledged that because of this
reason, Seventh Circuit decisions reflected the unanimous exclusion of
polygraph evidence.167 However, the court dismissed the importance
of the prosecution’s actions in this case, reasoning that the Seventh
Circuit had never adopted a blanket rule excluding polygraph
evidence.168
In Chapman v. California, the Supreme Court acknowledged the
egregiousness of introducing a defendant’s exercise of his
constitutional right to silence as incriminating evidence.169Although it
refused to hold that any and all constitutional violations constituted
reversible error, the Court equated the flagrancy of admitting a
defendant’s constitutional silence as evidence with a coerced
confession,170 and held that such an inference of guilt could not be
considered a harmless error. “An error in admitting plainly relevant
evidence which possibly influenced the jury adversely to a litigant
cannot, under Fahy,171 be conceived of as harmless.”172
In his dissent, Judge Bauer also recognized the abhorrence of this
type of error. Judge Bauer explained that the error committed by the
district court in Resnick, violated a bedrock principle of the criminal
justice system—imposing a penalty for exercising a constitutional
right.173 He correctly pointed out that by admitting Resnick’s refusal to
166

Id. at 896.
Id. at 897.
168
Id.
169
See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 26 (1967)
170
Id.
171
Fahey v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963) (concluding that
constitutional errors which had a reasonable possibility of contributing to the
conviction should not be treated as harmless).
172
Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23-24; id. at 26 (explaining that “Petitioners [were]
entitled to a trial free from the pressure of unconstitutional inferences.”).
173
United States v. Resnick, 823 F.3d 888, 901(7th Cir. 2016) (Bauer, J.,
dissenting), reh’g en banc denied, 835 F.3d 658 (7th Cir. 2016); see United States v.
Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 36 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 362 (1910)) (recognizing that placing more weight on
constitutional errors when assessing plain error is approved by precedent).
167
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take a polygraph as substantive evidence, it implicitly led the jury to
believe that polygraph tests are reliable and probative.174 This
misguided belief, he argued, tainted the entire case by inducing the
jurors to place an undue amount of weight on Resnick’s refusal to take
a polygraph, thereby undermining Resnick’s credibility.175
Finally, the court failed to take the context in which the comments
by the prosecution were made into account. The Supreme Court has
held that a prosecutor’s wrongful comments must be looked at in
context to determine their egregiousness.176 In Young, the Court held
that the prosecution’s comments about its personal beliefs as to the
defendant’s guilt177 were not plain error.178 The Court reasoned that
because the prosecution’s comments came as a response to the defense
counsel’s insinuation that not even the prosecution believed in the
defendant’s guilt, the prosecution was merely defending his personal
impression since defense counsel had asked for it.179 The Court
explained that any potential harm from the prosecutor’s remark was
mitigated by the fact that the jury understood that the comments were
only made to defend an insinuation.180 The Court concluded that
although the prosecution’s comments were wrongful, they did not
compromise the jury’s deliberations.181
Similar to the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit has held that
prosecutorial comments referencing a defendant’s constitutional rights
must be viewed in context of whether (1) the prosecutor manifestly
174

Resnick, 823 F.3d at 901-02 (Bauer, J., dissenting).
Id. (Bauer, J., dissenting).
176
See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 10-11, 13-14 (1985); Robinson,
485 U.S. at 33 (explaining that a prosecutorial comment as to a defendant’s silence
must be looked at in the context under which the comment was made).
177
A prosecutor may not comment as to his or her own personal belief as to
the defendant’s guilt because “the prosecutor’s opinion carries with it the imprimatur
of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the Government’s judgment
rather than its own view of the evidence.” Young, 470 U.S. at 18-19.
178
Id. at 20.
179
Id. at 17-18.
180
Id.
181
Id. at 18.
175
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intended to use the defendant’s exercise of his right as evidence of
guilt, or (2) the character of the remark would lead a jury to naturally
and necessarily treat it as evidence of defendant’s guilt.182 In
Resnick,183 the prosecution very clearly intended to use Resnick’s
refusal to submit to a polygraph as substantive evidence of his guilt.
First, the prosecution used Resnick’s refusal in its case in chief.184
During direct examination, one of the FBI agents who searched
Resnick’s home testified that Resnick had declined to take a polygraph
without speaking to his counsel first and that, to his knowledge,
Resnick never did end up taking one.185 Moreover, during its closing
argument, the prosecution told the jury it wanted to leave them with
defendant’s lies.186 It proceeded to publish a demonstrative exhibit
listing Resnick’s answers to interview questions and noted that
Resnick had refused to take a polygraph.187 The prosecution then
asserted that this refusal, coupled with his other denials, evidenced
Resnick’s consciousness of guilt.188 Both of these instances, especially
when coupled together, are an explicit, barefaced use of Resnick’s
exercise of his right to silence as substantive evidence of guilt.
Furthermore, it is indisputable that these overtly incriminating remarks
would be very likely to lead a jury to treat them as such.
C.

The Seventh Circuit Placed an Inordinate Amount of
Emphasis on the Other Evidence Against Resnick When
Evaluating Prejudice

By focusing on the “overwhelming” evidence against Resnick to
ultimately conclude that Resnick’s substantial rights were not affected,
182

United States v. Ochoa-Zarate, 540 F.3d 613, 618 (7th Cir. 2008).
United States v. Resnick, 823 F.3d 888 (7th Circ. 2016), reh’g en banc
denied, 835 F.3d 658 (7th Cir. 2016).
184
Id. at 892.
185
Id.
186
Id. at 900 (Bauer, J., dissenting).
187
Id.
188
Id.
183
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the Seventh Circuit turned plain error analysis into an inquiry over
Resnick’s guilt or innocence—a question not at issue under plain error
analysis.189 Most disturbingly, as Judge Bauer pointed out in his
dissent, the court’s holding implied that a court may ignore egregious
violations of a defendant’s constitutional rights if the evidence against
him is strong enough.190 Because jurors are not mandated to give the
reasons for their decisions, in most cases it would be impossible for a
defendant to show that an error influenced the jurors’ decision.191 As
Judge Bauer pointed out in his dissent in Resnick, only a defendant
who could show he was innocent would be able to make a showing
that he suffered actual prejudice at the hands of an error.192 For these
reasons, instead of considering the “overwhelming evidence” against
Resnick as the dispositive factor, the Seventh Circuit should have
followed the precedent set by Hills193 to determine whether Resnick’s
substantial rights were affected.
Notwithstanding the fact that neither the Atkinson standard nor the
language of Rule 52(b) implicate the weight of evidence against the
accused as part of plain error analysis, Judge Bauer, in his dissent on
petition for rehearing en banc,194 aptly noted that “[t]here is no
evidentiary demarcation line that when traversed with enough
damning evidence of guilt permits the government and the court to
deny a criminal defendant the right to a fair jury trial.”195
189

See id. at 902 (Bauer, J., dissenting) (“Resnick’s guilt is not at issue on
appeal; we only review whether he received a fair trial.”).
190
See id.
191
See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 743 (1993) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that some errors bearing on the jury’s deliberations are
subject to reversal partly because it is very difficult to measure the errors’ effect on
the jury’s decision).
192
See Resnick, 823 F.3d at 902 (Bauer, J., dissenting).
193
The court in Hills applied a five-factor harmless error analysis to determine
whether a defendant’s substantial rights were affected. United States v. Hills, 618
F.3d 619, 641 (7th Cir. 2010).
194
Judge Posner, Judge Flaum, and Judge Kanne joined in the dissent.
195
United States v. Resnick, 835 F.3d 658, 660 (7th Cir. 2016) (dissent from
denial of rehearing en banc).
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The Court Ignored the Injurious Effect of the Error to the
Integrity of the Judicial System.

As explained earlier, the Atkinson Court was concerned with an
error’s broad effect on the integrity of the judicial system.196 However,
the Seventh Circuit made no mention of this principle in its Resnick
decision. As Judge Bauer recognized, the gravity of the district court’s
error affected the integrity of judicial proceedings.197 The implications
of allowing this type of error undermine the authority of the
Constitution and give the government a carte blanche to violate a
defendant’s rights at trial. As long as there is enough evidence against
the accused, the prosecution may feel free to use a defendant’s
constitutional privileges against him. Just as the Seventh Circuit
should have followed its decision in Hills to determine whether
Resnick’s substantial rights had been affected, it should have also
turned to Hills in its analysis of Olano’s fourth prong. In Hills, the
court embraced Atkinson’s principle—the court looked beyond the
effect of the error to just the defendant.198 Instead, the court accounted
for the error’s injury to the integrity of the judicial system and for the
demoralization of the Constitution.199 I think you need a concluding
thought here to tie this section up.
HOW PLAIN ERROR REVIEW SHOULD BE CORRECTED
Given the confusion created by the complexity of the Olano fourpart inquiry it is not surprising that the Seventh Circuit wrongly
decided Resnick. This confusion is patently apparent in the
discrepancy between the Hills decision and the Resnick opinion
despite the similarity of the facts. Today’s version of plain error
196

See United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936) (citing New York
Central R. Co. v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 310, 318 and Brasfield v. United States, 272
U.S. 448, 450 (1926)).
197
Resnick, 823 F.3d at 902 (Bauer, J., dissenting).
198
See Hills, 618 F.3d at 642.
199
Id.
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analysis has strayed too far from the principles supporting Atkinson.
Instead of focusing on the gravity of an error or its effect on the
integrity of the court, today’s standard narrowly focuses on the effect
of the error on the particular outcome of a case. This is evidenced by
Olano’s requirement of a showing of actual prejudice by a defendant.
As discussed earlier in this Comment, this is not a part of the plain
error doctrine. Instead, this extremely high hurdle is more reminiscent
of the more stringent cause and actual prejudice standard as explained
in United States v. Frady.200 For all practical purposes, a showing of
actual prejudice essentially requires that a defendant show that he is
innocent because of the extreme difficulty of showing that a jury
would have decided differently had the error not been introduced.
This required showing of prejudice is at the heart of the problem
with today’s plain error doctrine. No court has been able to quantify
exactly how much prejudice must be shown in plain error analysis.
Adding to the confusion is Olano’s failure to unpack what it meant by
asserting that plain error must be found only in cases where failure to
correct the error would result in a “miscarriage of justice.”201 The
Olano Court explained that in collateral review jurisprudence, the term
“miscarriage of justice” meant that the defendant was actually
innocent, and while the court asserted that this would suffice to satisfy
the fourth prong of its test, a showing of innocence was not
necessary.202 The problem, however, is that the Court failed to indicate
what else besides a showing of innocence qualified as a miscarriage of
justice under plain error review.
In order to repair the plain error doctrine, courts must return to the
principle in which the doctrine was grounded—namely the need for
public faith in the integrity of the judicial system. This requires that
courts return to focusing plain error analysis on the egregiousness of
the error and its effect on the public’s confidence in the fairness of
200

United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982).
See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736-37 (1993). Recall that Olano
equated miscarriage of justice with its fourth prong of “seriously affecting the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.
202
Id. at 736.
201
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judicial proceedings. In interpreting Rule 52(b), courts must be
cognizant of these principles. The Hills decision provides a good
working standard for application of the complicated “substantial
rights” inquiry. The five factors the Hills court applied to determine
whether the defendant’s substantial rights had been imposed on203 are
in keeping with Rule 52(b)’s language, which only requires that the
error affect substantial rights. Importantly, by applying the five factors
used in Hills, other evidence weighing on the defendant’s guilt is
relegated to being just one of five factors to be weighed, rather than
being dispositive.
Plain error review would be best served if the Olano test was
retained but altered to reflect the spirit of Atkinson. First, the first and
second prongs should be retained to determine the gravity of the error,
with constitutional violations studied more scrupulously. Second, the
test should include the factors in Hills204 to determine whether a
defendant’s substantial rights were violated. Finally, an appellate court
should consider whether the judicial system would be harmed in light
of the egregiousness of the error. Under this plain error analysis,
Resnick’s conviction would have more than likely been vacated and
the case remanded for further proceedings, which would have been the
correct result.
CONCLUSION
Plain error review was grounded in the principle that courts
should correct errors that, if left unrectified, could undermine the

203

These five factors are: (1) the intensity and frequency of the wrongful
prosecutorial remarks; (2) which party elected to pursue the line of questioning; (3)
the use to which the prosecution put the defendant’s Fifth Amendment silence; (4)
the trial judge’s opportunity to grant a motion for mistrial or give a curative
instruction; and (5) the quantum of other evidence indicative of guilt. Hills, 618 F.3d
at 641.
204
Id.
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integrity of the judicial system.205 The Atkinson plain error standard
embodied this principle. The United States Supreme Court, however,
has over time strayed from this original standard by focusing more
narrowly on the outcosme of a particular trial. The complexity and
vagueness of the current doctrine has created confusion and
inconsistency of decisions, including within the Seventh Circuit. The
doctrine must be revised to look beyond any damage an uncorrected
error may cause to a single individual. Instead, plain error analysis
must also account for something greater—the public’s faith in our
judicial system.

205

See United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936); New York C.R.
Co. v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 310, 318-19 (1929); Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S.
448, 450 (1926).
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